DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR IN THE YEARS TO COME--- A Sample Essay
Introduction:
The use of atom bomb in the World War-II created a sense of
insecurity among the weaker nations around the globe. This freakish (unusual, strange) obsession (phobia) culminated into (reach its highest or final point ) the
development of a new kind of weapons called “Nuclear Weapons”. The fear of
being erased further deepened when atomic weapons started serving as
commodities (product that can be sold) of
strategic, political and economic commerce. The United States of America
started the atomic age about 60 years ago, on August 6 and 9, 1945, when it
dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then, not only
bomb-surviving victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also the peace loving
people of the world have strongly opposed the existence of nuclear weapons. The
world would truly be a better place to live in if there were no weapons
whatsoever. The atomic weapons increase the tension and the acceleration of
violence among the countries of the world. Global concern for the use of atomic
weapons is multidimensional and should be taken as merely an effort for
non-proliferation. These horrendous (horrible)
weapons have the capacity in them to destroy millions of people in a matter of moments.
Nuclear Age:
A nuclear war is one, which is fought not with the
conventional weapons but with the nuclear ones. The history of the world has
seen only once the use of nuclear weapons and it was sui generis. It was back
in August 1945 when America dropped nuclear weapons on Heroshima and Nagasaki,
the bad luck cities of japan, during the second World War. Millions of people
were killed in a seconds and those who survived rendered disabled. Even up to
this day, the births in those regions are abnormal
During the World War II, America inaugurated
the nuclear age by dropping the atomic bomb on Japan, this age passed through
the Cold War with its indirect conflicts between the nuclear superpowers, to
the present age when fear of nuclear attack has been shifted to a fear of rogue
states and terrorists. The fear generated by the idea that nuclear war is
possible and every conflict on nuclear tensions may lead the world to nuclear
conflagration (a great and destructive fire)
is not baseless. One important element having great import and influence
throughout the nuclear age is the group of professionals who guides nuclear
policy and who develops all strategy on the basis of the perceived nuclear
threat. These professionals are sometimes referred to as the priesthood. Every
action on the part of the nuclear powers is tied to the nuclear threat.
On August 6, 1945, the United States exploded an untested
uranium-235 gun-assembly bomb, nicknamed "Little Boy," 1,900 feet
above Hiroshima. The city was home to an estimated 350,000 people; about
140,000 died by the end of the year. Three days later, at 11:02 am, the United
States exploded a plutonium implosion bomb nicknamed "Fat Man" 1,650
feet above Nagasaki. About 70,000 of the estimated 270,000 residents died by
the end of the year.
Nuclear Deterrence:
The advent of nuclear weapons
changed the approach to foreign policy and diplomatic relations for many
countries. During the period known as the Cold War, the threat of mutually
assured destruction helped prevent the outbreak (sudden
eruption of war, disease etc.) of full-scale nuclear war. However, while
nuclear weapons have prevented wars in which the mutual destruction of the
combatants is assured, nuclear weapons have not prevented wars where nuclear
weapons are not used. In fact, recent wars like the Iraq-America,
Afghan-America Wars were primarily undertaken by the United States of America
because of the threat of nuclear weapons falling into enemy hands. As such,
while nuclear weapons have influenced military and foreign policy and diplomatic
relations among nations, they have seldom prevented wars from occurring (take place) that do not rely on them. In fact,
over the past 34 years, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enacted in
1970, has not been successful in putting and end to state development of
nuclear weapons.
Threat of Nuclear War:
Many
things relating to nuclear proliferation have changed since the collapse of the
Soviet Union. From the declared nuclear powers, to worldwide tensions and
so-called “Hot Spots”, the nuclear situation has changed dramatically over the
years. Some would say that the threat of a nuclear war has gone down in today’s
post Soviet society. They are, of course, wrong. The threat of a nuclear war is
greater now that the cold war is over because, more nations have nuclear
warheads, the smuggling of nuclear materials is on the rise, and nuclear
treaties are ineffective.
Many nations
have nuclear warheads. While this could be construed as a bad thing, many
nuclear powers do not adhere to the old ‘us and them’ theory. It is no longer a
fight between the communist and capitalist societies. While more nations have
the technology to make nuclear warheads, many do not due to political pressure.
The most common reason for the development of nuclear warheads is to prove a
said nation’s ability to do so. For example, South Africa developed the
technology to produce nuclear missiles, and then dismantled them. (1) In doing
so it became the first nation to voluntarily giving up its nuclear missiles.
SOME TOPICS IN THIS ESSAY:
Soviet
Union, India Pakistan, United Russia, START II, NPT Russia, Alexander Lebed,
Weapons Inspectors, South Africa, United Nations, North Korea, nuclear
warheads, soviet union, cold war, nuclear material, nuclear war, nuclear powers,
threat nuclear war, threat nuclear, nuclear weapons, collapse soviet union,
material left, proliferation nuclear, war cold war, nations nuclear warheads,
nuclear war cold,
Consequences
of the Threat of Nuclear War:
The
Earth contains over six billion people and of these approximately 240 million
are attempting to flee war, persecution poverty, and environmental degradation.
While progress has been made, turbulence (disturbance)
continues in the Middle East, Africa, South and Central Asia, and parts of
Southeast Asia. Problems need to be resolved to end mass destruction and
terrorist attacks.
People are on the move to escape war. On this list are
distinguished physicists (person skilled or
qualified in physics) who served to fight the spread of war with the
production of atomic bombs and nuclear weapons. By the end of Word War II,
Europe contained over 40 million displaced persons. The end of the Cold War
began a new phase in politics but armed camps continue to exist. Economic and
political conflicts are common among major nations of the world and problems of
poverty and starvation continue. People continue to fight to gain economic
development and political freedom. While the United States defense industry has
adjusted to the end of the Cold War and remains technically strong and
financially healthy, it continues to face threats to national security ahead. A
study is needed to more fully understand war views within a social
psychological perspective. Social psychology seeks to identify and examine relationships
among attitudes. Johnson, Handler and Criss proposed that the individual and
their social system are mutually supportive and cultural beliefs serve to
perpetuate war attitudes. For example, ethnic prejudice generated and
supported by cultural beliefs may translate into enemy images. In this case
anti-Muslim attitudes may be generalized to national enemy images, which
support war acceptance attitudes. A study is needed to help identify and
understand the attitudes that support war acceptance beliefs, in order to
provide information necessary for the generation of concrete strategies for
changing these beliefs. Purpose of the Study The purpose of the study is to
explore attitudes and beliefs towards war, nationalism, internationalism.
Some common words found in the essay are:
Handler Criss, Hyams Bartholomew, Study Adults, United
SovietƳ, Theoretical Framework, Silverstein Holt, United
Kingdom, Cold War, Images Enemy, Organization Research,
war acceptance, enemy images, war acceptance attitudes, acceptance
attitudes, johnson handler criss, johnson handler, handler
criss, handler criss 1987, criss 1987, social psychology,
support war, nationalism internationalism, support war
acceptance, related war acceptance, chemical biological
The Cold War:
One
historian defines the Cold War as period of East-West competition, tension, and
conflict short of full-scale war, characterized by mutual perceptions of
hostile intention between military-political alliances or blocs. Both the
United States and the Soviet Union share the responsibility for the start and
continuation of the Cold War in the period between 1945 and 1963.
During World War II, the U.S. and
the Soviets were allies committed to the defeat of mutual enemies - Japan and
Germany. At the end of the War, as the allies struggled to reconfigure (re-arrangement) the European polity and
establish a new order in the East, the interests of the Soviet Union and the
United States came into direct collision. For western leaders and their
diplomats, World War II had a successful but hardly "neat" ending;
too many questions were left unanswered, such as the future of Poland and
Germany, which had been opened at Yalta and Potsdam but left unresolved. For
the allies of the West, Soviet determination to retain physical and political
control over territories captured during the War was suspect. Had Russia
liberated Eastern Europe, or merely replaced Germany as its master? That was
the critical question being asked in 1945; Truman and others in the West
objected to Stalin's plans to retain control of Poland.
The Marshall Plan was another Cold War American response to
perceived potentials for communist aggression; in this Plan, the U.S. provided
billions of dollars of aid to European Allies. American policy vis-a-vis the
Soviets focused on "containment," or maintenance of existing Soviet
borders via an American policy combining political, military and economic
elements. The Berlin Airlift, enacted after Stalin attempted to cut off the
Western-controlled sector of Berlin, demonstrated Western resolve and
determination. These events, however, tended to increase tensions. The entire
period from 1945 to 1963 was a period in which both the U.S. and the Soviets
attempted to sway world opinion and attract the loyalty and support of other
countries by providing funds and other material support. The threat of the bomb
and Soviet possession of the bomb was of enormous significance in shaping
American foreign policy and increasing American fears of the "Russian
Bear." With China finally in the communist "camp," American
fears increased dramatically; a "Red scare" at home, fueled by Joe
McCarthy and his Congressional investigation, added to domestic tensions and
fears. China's "defection" in spite of massive American aid to
nationalist Chiang Ka
During the Cold War era, tensions between east and west, conflict short
of full-scale war, and a major superpower arms race characterized conditions
among major nations with nuclear weapons. Until the end of the Cold War in the
late 1980s, tensions continued between the superpowers with respect to nuclear
weapons, but the official stance among nations like the U.S. and former Soviet
Union was one of peaceful coexistence. However, the Cold War tensions and
events like the Cuban Missile Crisis prompted governmetal agreement. When
George Bush explained his justification for going to war against Iraq, he cited
IraqƳ intention to build and deploy Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) as his
main reason for the war. In this sense, nuclear weapons prompted the outbreak
of war rather than deterring it. The challenges facing the NPT demonstrate that
nuclear arms capability has not deterred war. Currently both North Korea and
Iran are being monitored for nuclear weapons capability and buildup. The NPT was
designed as a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons
technology, and to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
It is also designed to ?ther the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and
general and complete disarmament,?nited p. 1). Included in NPT provisions is a
safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through
IAEA inspections. The NPT is reviewed every five years by its signatories
(United p. 1). Despite such safeguards and attempts to promote nuclear
disarmament, nations continue to attempt to gain nuclear weapons capability
from Pakistan to North Korea. In January, 2003, the go
The Consequences
of Nuclear Conflict
between India and
Pakistan
The months-long military standoff between India and
Pakistan intensified several weeks ago when terrorists killed many people
during their attack on Taj Mahal Hotel, Mumbai. According to the research of
Pentagon, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan can result in 12 million
deaths. Most of the possible war scenarios focus on Kashmir where most
international observers believe even a small conflict has the potential of
escalating into a full-fledged war.
NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council) of USA has conducted
its own analysis of the consequences of nuclear war in South Asia. Prior to
this most recent crisis, it calculated two nuclear scenarios. The first
assumes 10 Hiroshima-sized explosions with no fallout (radioactive debris (waste)
caused by a nuclear explosion); the second assumes 24 nuclear explosions
with significant radioactive fallout. Below is a discussion of the two
scenarios in detail and an exploration of several additional issues regarding
nuclear war in South Asia.
Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Forces:
It is difficult to determine the actual size and composition
of India's and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, but NRDC estimates that both
countries have a total of 50 to 75 weapons. Contrary to the conventional
wisdom, we believe India has about 30 to 35 nuclear warheads, slightly fewer
than Pakistan, which may have as many as 48.
Both countries have fission weapons, similar to the early
designs developed by the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s. NRDC
estimates their explosive yields are 5 to 25 kilotons (1 kiloton is equivalent
to 1,000 tons of TNT). By comparison, the yield of the weapon the United States
exploded over Hiroshima was 15 kilotons, while the bomb exploded over Nagasaki
was 21 kilotons. According to a recent NRDC discussion with a senior Pakistani
military official, Pakistan's main nuclear weapons are mounted on missiles.
India's nuclear weapons are reportedly gravity bombs deployed on fighter
aircraft.
For the first scenario NRDC used casualty
data from the Hiroshima bomb to estimate what would happen if bombs exploded
over 10 large South Asian cities: five in India and five in Pakistan. The
15-kiloton yield of the Hiroshima weapon is approximately the size of the
weapons now in the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals. If nuclear weapons
are dropped on five big cities of each country the estimated death toll would
about 2,862,581 people who would die on the spot and 1,506,859 would get
injured severely.
Ten Hiroshima-size explosions over 10 major
cities in India and Pakistan would kill as many as three to four times more
people per bomb than in Japan because of the higher urban densities in Indian
and Pakistani cities.
NRDC calculated that 22.1 million people in India and Pakistan
would be exposed to lethal radiation doses of 600 rem or more in the first two
days after the attack. Another 8 million people would receive a radiation dose
of 100 to 600 rem, causing severe radiation sickness and potentially death,
especially for the very young, old or infirm. NRDC calculates that as many as
30 million people would be threatened by the fallout from the attack, roughly
divided between the two countries.
Besides fallout, blast and fire would cause substantial
destruction within roughly a mile-and-a-half of the bomb craters. NRDC
estimates that 8.1 million people live within this radius of destruction.
Most Indians (99 percent of the population) and Pakistanis (93
percent of the population) would survive the second scenario. Their respective
military forces would be still be intact to continue and even escalate the
conflict.
After India and Pakistan held nuclear tests in 1998, experts
have debated whether their nuclear weapons contribute to stability in South
Asia. Experts who argue that the nuclear standoff promotes stability have
pointed to the U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War as an example of how deterrence
ensures military restraint.
Differences
between the Cold War and the current South Asian crisis
There are major differences between the Cold
War and the current South Asian crisis. Unlike the U.S.-Soviet experience,
these two countries have a deep-seated hatred of one another and have fought
three wars since both countries became independent. At least part of the
current crisis may be seen as Hindu extremism versus Muslim nationalism.
2. A second
difference is India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are much smaller than those
of the United States and Russia. The U.S. and Russian arsenals truly represent
the capability to destroy each other's society beyond recovery. While the two
South Asia scenarios we have described produce unimaginable loss of life and
destruction, they do not reach the level of "mutual assured
destruction" that stood as the ultimate deterrent during the Cold War.
3. No
conventional war between India and Pakistan will remain limited for long time
and will gradually lead to a full-scale war and ultimately to a nuclear
conflict, warns a study by a Pakistani defense official.
4. The study
by the Pakistani defense official envisages possible Pakistani response to a
various proposals being discussed in India's defense circles for dealing with
the Kashmir insurgency, which India blames on Pakistan-backed militants.
But the author warns that what India may see as a limited
conventional war, may not be accepted to Pakistan as such. Similarly, what
India defines as limited political perspective, may have a different
implication for Pakistan, he adds.
The author points out that most Western analysts and
scholars are not comfortable with India's limited war doctrine and they also
believe that a limited war between India and Pakistan cannot remain limited for
long.
Comparing nuclear policies of the two countries, the author
says that the central theme of Pakistan's nuclear policy guidelines is to act
in a responsible manner and to exercise restraint in conduct of its deterrence
policy.
Pakistan, he said, also wants to ensure that its nuclear
capability does not pose any threat to non-nuclear weapon states in the region.
Pakistan's nuclear capability is very clear for deterrence
of aggression and defense of its sovereignty, the author said.
India's declared nuclear doctrine, he said, is based on a
posture of no first use of nuclear weapons. India, however, retains the option
of using nuclear weapons in retaliation against a nuclear, biological or
chemical attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.
India's doctrine contains an inbuilt offensive design. The
most dangerous aspect of this policy is that it keeps the option open for a
conventional war against Pakistan, according to the author.
Asked why Pakistan had used the option of a limited
conventional war in Kargil in 1999, the author said Kargil is part of Siachen
sector where limited battles have continued since 1984. Kargil, he said, was a
continuation of the same ongoing skirmishes between India and Pakistan.
The author then explains various options India may exercise
for launching a limited conventional war against Pakistan. These include:
-- Surgical strikes conducted along the Line of Control in
Kashmir against Pakistani troops and jihadi camps, which India says Pakistan is
running on its side of Kashmir.
The Indians have already attacked along the LoC to prevent
Kashmiri fighters from crossing into Indian Kashmir but never succeeded in
acquiring the desired results. So far, India only uses artillery for launching
these surgical strikes into Pakistani Kashmir but under the new strategy they
will also use air strikes for hitting targets across the LoC.
-- Hot pursuits that include physically crossing the LoC
and battling envisaged jihadi camps or capturing certain areas. It is an open
option, says the author. In any war scenario, India can use it."
But if they do so, Pakistan is not going to sit quiet. It will
be an act of war which will not remain limited and it can escalate to a
full-scale war and ultimately it can lead to a nuclear conflict if Pakistan's
national interests are threatened, the author warns.
-- Cold start strategy for which India has been raising
eight to 10 combat groups to implement this new strategy. Each group will
include forces from the army and the air force and, if required, from the navy.
Each combat group will have a hard-hitting force of
3,000-4,000 troops and it should be able to achieve its objective in 72 hours,
before Pakistan reacts or approaches the international community.
The author says that Pakistan will not view an attack by
this new force as a limited war. For us it will be a full-scale war, and
Pakistan will respond with full resources, and if we fail to contain the
Indians, the nuclear factor will definitely come in.
Explaining how a conventional war can lead to a nuclear
conflict, the author says: In a full conventional war, India has the potential
to create impact. And if it does so, it will force Pakistan to use its nuclear
option.
Before the two countries acquired nuclear capability,
India's strategy was to invade Pakistan and divide it into north and south. By
severing all links between the two parts of the country, India hoped to force
Pakistan to negotiate peace on New Delhi's terms.
The Indians, the author said, also are considering a number
of other options for launching a fast but effective incursion into Pakistan
without causing a full-scale war.
But in the final analysis, he said, all options to
initiate war by India may look independent and workable but ultimately will
lead to the same destination which both sides would like to avoid as
responsible nuclear states.
Do Nuclear Weapons Pose a Serious Threat?
Introduction
For over fifty years the “doomsday clock” has symbolized the
threat that nuclear weapons pose to the world. The clock has appeared at
various times on the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a
magazine about global security that was founded at the end of World War II by
the scientists who developed the atomic bomb. Monitoring the clock is the
responsibility of the Bulletin’s scientists and international affairs
experts, who move its hands forward or backward depending on international
events. When things go well, such as the signing of an arms control agreement,
the hands move farther from midnight, which represents nuclear holocaust. When
things go poorly, such as when a nation tests a nuclear weapon for the first
time, the hands move closer to midnight.
On February 27, 2002, the clock’s guardians moved the minute
hand of the clock forward, from nine to seven minutes to midnight, only the
third time in the history of the clock that the hand has moved forward. In
explaining their decision, the Bulletin’s board of directors said that
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks should have been a “global wake-up
call” about serious threats to global security. Yet as Bulletin editor
Linda Rothstein explains, “Even . . . after September 11, many of us—and much
of the U.S. media—remain disturbingly disengaged from the rest of the world.”
The magazine’s directors report that “moving the clock’s hands at this time
reflects our growing concern that the international community has hit the
‘snooze’ button rather than respond to the alarm.” Moreover, although the
September 11 attacks prompted the United States to wage a war against terrorism
to reduce the chances that a terrorist group would attack America with weapons
of mass destruction, many security experts argue that America is one of the
main culprits making such an event likely to happen. Indeed, many analysts
believe that America’s actions— before and after September 11—have made the
world less safe for all nations, including the United States.
Experts cite several key reasons why they have fingered
America as a nuclear threat. To begin with, they point out, 95 percent of the
world’s thirty-one thousand nuclear weapons are located in the United States
and Russia, with sixteen thousand of those operationally deployed. In addition,
most of the U.S. weapons that have been removed from the active stockpile have
not been dismantled but stored for possible future use. The United States will
retain a stockpile of over ten thousand warheads well into the future.
Another fact that worries scientists and security experts is
that U.S. weapons labs are now refining old weapons and designing new ones. For
example, weapons scientists are designing “bunker busters,” nuclear weapons
designed to penetrate deeply buried targets in order to destroy weapons labs
and storage facilities dug deep into the mountains of hostile nations. Many
arms experts contend that building more nuclear weapons—no matter what type—is
simply fostering nuclear proliferation and further endangering global security.
The United States also continues to stockpile nearly 750
metric tons of weapon-grade uranium and 85 metric tons of weapon-grade
plutonium. Since America has never satisfactorily kept track of these
materials, many critics claim, it is impossible to verify if all of it is
accounted for. Many commentators worry that some of this material may be
migrating into the hands of terrorists, who could use it to build “dirty
bombs,” conventional explosives packed with nuclear materials that could be
used against the United States.
Developments on the international front have experts worried
as well. One of the most serious concerns is America’s 2001 withdrawal from the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which prohibited the United States
and Russia from developing space- and ground-based defensive nuclear weapons.
The Bush administration believes that a missile defense system, capable of
destroying enemy missiles in the air, is crucial to protect the U.S. homeland
from nuclear attack; since the treaty did not allow America to develop such a
system, the administration felt it necessary to quit the treaty. However,
critics point out that the launching of a missile defense system will only encourage
other nations to develop weapons to defeat it, leading to arms proliferation.
Another international diplomacy failure on the part of the
United States, according to those concerned about global security, is President
George W. Bush’s provocative speech in which he named Iran, Iraq, and North
Korea the “axis of evil” in part because of their attempts to develop nuclear
weapons. Bush put these nations on notice that America would not sit idle while
they pursued the development of weapons of mass destruction. Many commentators
believe that this veiled threat will only force these nations and others to
develop nuclear arms as protection against an aggressive America.
For these reasons the guardians of the doomsday clock insist
that before they can move the hands of the clock farther from midnight, the
United States must seriously reexamine its nuclear policies. The authors in At
Issue: Do Nuclear Weapons Pose a Serious Threat? discuss the extent of the
nuclear danger facing the world today and debate the best methods for enhancing
nuclear security. The doomsday clock is a clear indicator that a reassessment
of current nuclear dangers is vital. As Bulletin analysts put it, “The
clock is ticking.”
The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict between India and
Pakistan
NRDC's nuclear experts think
about the unthinkable, using state-of-the-art nuclear war simulation software
to assess the crisis in South Asia.
The months-long military
standoff between India and Pakistan intensified several weeks ago when
suspected Islamic militants killed more than 30 people at an Indian base in the
disputed territory of Kashmir. As U.S. diplomatic pressure to avert war
intensifies, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is going to India and
Pakistan this week to discuss with his South Asian counterparts the results of
a classified Pentagon study that concludes that a nuclear war between these
countries could result in 12 million deaths.
NRDC (Natural Resources
Defense Council) has conducted its own analysis of the consequences of nuclear
war in South Asia. Prior to this most recent crisis we calculated two nuclear
scenarios. The first assumes 10 Hiroshima-sized explosions with no fallout; the
second assumes 24 nuclear explosions with significant radioactive fallout. Below
is a discussion of the two scenarios in detail and an exploration of several
additional issues regarding nuclear war in South Asia.
Indian and Pakistani
Nuclear Forces
It is difficult to determine
the actual size and composition of India's and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, but
NRDC estimates that both countries have a total of 50 to 75 weapons. Contrary
to the conventional wisdom, we believe India has about 30 to 35 nuclear
warheads, slightly fewer than Pakistan, which may have as many as 48.
Both countries have fission
weapons, similar to the early designs developed by the United States in the
late 1940s and early 1950s. NRDC estimates their explosive yields are 5 to 25
kilotons (1 kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT). By comparison, the
yield of the weapon the United States exploded over Hiroshima was 15 kilotons,
while the bomb exploded over Nagasaki was 21 kilotons. According to a recent
NRDC discussion with a senior Pakistani military official, Pakistan's main
nuclear weapons are mounted on missiles. India's nuclear weapons are reportedly
gravity bombs deployed on fighter aircraft.
NRDC's Nuclear Program
initially developed the software used to calculate the consequences of a South
Asian nuclear war to examine and analyze the U.S. nuclear war planning process.
We combined Department of Energy and Department of Defense computer codes with
meteorological and demographic data to model what would happen in various kinds
of attacks using different types of weapons. Our June 2001 report, "The
U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change," is available at
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/warplan/index.asp.
Scenario: 10 Bombs on 10
South Asian Cities
For our first scenario we
used casualty data from the Hiroshima bomb to estimate what would happen if
bombs exploded over 10 large South Asian cities: five in India and five in
Pakistan. (The results were published in "The Risks and Consequences of
Nuclear War in South Asia," by NRDC physicist Matthew McKinzie and
Princeton scientists Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar and M. V. Ramana, a chapter in
Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian (editors), "Out of the Nuclear Shadow"
(Dehli: Lokayan and Rainbow Publishers, 2001).)
The 15-kiloton yield of the
Hiroshima weapon is approximately the size of the weapons now in the Indian and
Pakistani nuclear arsenals. The deaths and severe injuries experienced at
Hiroshima were mainly a function of how far people were from ground zero. Other
factors included whether people were in buildings or outdoors, the structural
characteristics of the buildings themselves, and the age and health of the
victims at the time of the attack. The closer to ground zero, the higher
fatality rate. Further away there were fewer fatalities and larger numbers of
injuries. The table below summarizes the first nuclear war scenario by superimposing
the Hiroshima data onto five Indian and five Pakistan cities with densely
concentrated populations.
Estimated nuclear
casualties for attacks on 10 large Indian and Pakistani cities
|
|
|
|
|
City Name
|
Total Population
Within 5 Kilometers of Ground Zero
|
Number of Persons
Killed
|
Number of Persons
Severely Injured
|
Number of Persons
Slightly Injured
|
India
|
|
|
|
|
Bangalore
|
3,077,937
|
314,978
|
175,136
|
411,336
|
Bombay
|
3,143,284
|
477,713
|
228,648
|
476,633
|
Calcutta
|
3,520,344
|
357,202
|
198,218
|
466,336
|
Madras
|
3,252,628
|
364,291
|
196,226
|
448,948
|
New Delhi
|
1,638,744
|
176,518
|
94,231
|
217,853
|
Total India
|
14,632,937
|
1,690,702
|
892,459
|
2,021,106
|
Pakistan
|
|
|
|
|
Faisalabad
|
2,376,478
|
336,239
|
174,351
|
373,967
|
Islamabad
|
798,583
|
154,067
|
66,744
|
129,935
|
Karachi
|
1,962,458
|
239,643
|
126,810
|
283,290
|
Lahore
|
2,682,092
|
258,139
|
149,649
|
354,095
|
Rawalpindi
|
1,589,828
|
183,791
|
96,846
|
220,585
|
Total Pakistan
|
9,409,439
|
1,171,879
|
614,400
|
1,361,872
|
India and
Pakistan
|
|
|
|
|
Total
|
24,042,376
|
2,862,581
|
1,506,859
|
3,382,978
|
As in the case of the bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in this scenario the 10 bombs over Indian
and Pakistani cities would be exploded in the air, which maximized blast damage
and fire but creates no fallout. On August 6, 1945, the United States exploded
an untested uranium-235 gun-assembly bomb, nicknamed "Little Boy,"
1,900 feet above Hiroshima. The city was home to an estimated 350,000 people;
about 140,000 died by the end of the year. Three days later, at 11:02 am, the
United States exploded a plutonium implosion bomb nicknamed "Fat Man"
1,650 feet above Nagasaki. About 70,000 of the estimated 270,000 residents died
by the end of the year.
Ten Hiroshima-size
explosions over 10 major cities in India and Pakistan would kill as many as
three to four times more people per bomb than in Japan because of the higher
urban densities in Indian and Pakistani cities.
Scenario: 24 Ground
Bursts
In January, NRDC calculated
the consequences of a much more severe nuclear exchange between India and
Pakistan. It first appeared as a sidebar in the January 14, 2002, issue of
Newsweek ("A Face-Off with Nuclear Stakes"). This scenario calculated
the consequences of 24 nuclear explosions detonated on the ground -- unlike the
Hiroshima airburst -- resulting in significant amounts of lethal radioactive
fallout.
Exploding a nuclear bomb
above the ground does not produce fallout. For example, the United States
detonated "Little Boy" weapon above Hiroshima at an altitude of 1,900
feet. At this height, the radioactive particles produced in the explosion were
small and light enough to rise into the upper atmosphere, where they were
carried by the prevailing winds. Days to weeks later, after the radioactive
bomb debris became less "hot," these tiny particles descended to
earth as a measurable radioactive residue, but not at levels of contamination
that would cause immediate radiation sickness or death.
Unfortunately, it is easier
to fuse a nuclear weapon to detonate on impact than it is to detonate it in the
air -- and that means fallout. If the nuclear explosion takes place at or near
the surface of the earth, the nuclear fireball would gouge out material and mix
it with the radioactive bomb debris, producing heavier radioactive particles.
These heavier particles would begin to drift back to earth within minutes or
hours after the explosion, producing potentially lethal levels of nuclear
fallout out to tens or hundreds of kilometers from the ground zero. The precise
levels depend on the explosive yield of the weapon and the prevailing winds.
For the second scenario, we
calculated the fallout patterns and casualties for a hypothetical nuclear
exchange between India and Pakistan in which each country targeted major
cities. We chose target cities throughout Pakistan and in northwestern India to
take into account the limited range of Pakistani missiles or aircraft. The
target cities, listed in the table below, include the capitals of Islamabad and
New Dehli, and large cities, such as Karachi and Bombay. In this scenario, we
assumed that a dozen, 25-kiloton warheads would be detonated as ground bursts
in Pakistan and another dozen in India, producing substantial fallout.
The devastation that would
result from fallout would exceed that of blast and fire. NRDC's second scenario
would produce far more horrific results than the first scenario because there
would be more weapons, higher yields, and extensive fallout. In some large
cities, we assumed more than one bomb would be used.
15 Indian and
Pakistani cities attacked with 24 nuclear warheads
|
|
|
|
Country
|
City
|
City Population
|
Number of
Attacking Bombs
|
Pakistan
|
Islamabad (national
capital)
|
100-250 thousand
|
1
|
Pakistan
|
Karachi (provincial
capital)
|
> 5 million
|
3
|
Pakistan
|
Lahore (provincial
capital)
|
1-5 million
|
2
|
Pakistan
|
Peshawar (provincial
capital)
|
0.5-1 million
|
1
|
Pakistan
|
Quetta (provincial
capital)
|
250-500 thousand
|
1
|
Pakistan
|
Faisalabad
|
1-5 million
|
2
|
Pakistan
|
Hyderabad
|
0.5-1 million
|
1
|
Pakistan
|
Rawalpindi
|
0.5-1 million
|
1
|
India
|
New Dehli (national
capital)
|
250-500 thousand
|
1
|
India
|
Bombay (provincial
capital)
|
> 5 million
|
3
|
India
|
Delhi (provincial
capital)
|
> 5 million
|
3
|
India
|
Jaipur (provincial
capital)
|
1-5 million
|
2
|
India
|
Bhopal (provincial
capital)
|
1-5 million
|
1
|
India
|
Ahmadabad
|
1-5 million
|
1
|
India
|
Pune
|
1-5 million
|
1
|
NRDC calculated that 22.1
million people in India and Pakistan would be exposed to lethal radiation doses
of 600 rem or more in the first two days after the attack. Another 8 million
people would receive a radiation dose of 100 to 600 rem, causing severe
radiation sickness and potentially death, especially for the very young, old or
infirm. NRDC calculates that as many as 30 million people would be threatened
by the fallout from the attack, roughly divided between the two countries.
Besides fallout, blast and
fire would cause substantial destruction within roughly a mile-and-a-half of
the bomb craters. NRDC estimates that 8.1 million people live within this
radius of destruction.
Most Indians (99 percent of
the population) and Pakistanis (93 percent of the population) would survive the
second scenario. Their respective military forces would be still be intact to
continue and even escalate the conflict.
Thinking the Unthinkable
After India and Pakistan
held nuclear tests in 1998, experts have debated whether their nuclear weapons
contribute to stability in South Asia. Experts who argue that the nuclear
standoff promotes stability have pointed to the U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War as an
example of how deterrence ensures military restraint.
NRDC disagrees. There are
major differences between the Cold War and the current South Asian crisis.
Unlike the U.S.-Soviet experience, these two countries have a deep-seated
hatred of one another and have fought three wars since both countries became
independent. At least part of the current crisis may be seen as Hindu
nationalism versus Muslim fundamentalism.
A second difference is India
and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are much smaller than those of the United
States and Russia. The U.S. and Russian arsenals truly represent the capability
to destroy each other's society beyond recovery. While the two South Asia
scenarios we have described produce unimaginable loss of life and destruction,
they do not reach the level of "mutual assured destruction" that
stood as the ultimate deterrent during the Cold War.
The two South Asian
scenarios assume nuclear attacks against cities. During the early Cold War
period this was the deterrent strategy of the United States and the Soviet
Union. But as both countries introduced technological improvements into their
arsenals, they pursued other strategies, targeting each other's nuclear forces,
conventional military forces, industry and leadership. India and Pakistan may
include these types of targets in their current military planning. For example,
attacking large dams with nuclear weapons could result in massive disruption,
economic consequences and casualties. Concentrations of military forces and
facilities may provide tempting targets as well.
Nuclear War A Real Fear In South Asia
From political games to deadly games, the nuclear option always remains open
for ANY of the 10 nations who already have the Bomb.
|
Washington (UPI) Dec 17 2004
No conventional war between India and Pakistan will remain limited for long
and will gradually lead to a full-scale war and ultimately to a nuclear
conflict, warns a study by a Pakistani defense official.
The study, presented recently at a Washington think-tank,
looks at various scenarios that could lead to an all-out war between the two
South Asian neighbors, which conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998
and also possess nuclear-capable missiles.
India and Pakistan have fought three wars since their
independence from Britain in 1947 and are still engaged in 57-year-old conflict
in the Himalayan valley of Kashmir which caused two of these three wars.
Most of the possible war scenarios discussed in this study
also focus on Kashmir where most international observers believe even a small
conflict has the potential of escalating into a full-fledged war.
Recently, both India and Pakistan have agreed to resolve
their differences through dialogue and have taken several steps lessen
tensions.
The study by the Pakistani defense official envisages
possible Pakistani response to a various proposals being discussed in India's
defense circles for dealing with the Kashmir insurgency, which India blames on
Pakistan-backed militants.
The author, who wished not to be identified, argues that
recently India has put forward the concept of a limited conventional war aimed
at achieving a specific political objective, such as putting down the uprising
in Kashmir.
But the author warns that what India may see as a limited
conventional war, may not be accepted to Pakistan as such. Similarly, what
India defines as limited political perspective, may have a different
implication for Pakistan, he adds.
The author points out that most Western analysts and
scholars are not comfortable with India's limited war doctrine and they also
believe that a limited war between India and Pakistan cannot remain limited for
long.
Comparing nuclear policies of the two countries, the author
says that the central theme of Pakistan's nuclear policy guidelines is to act
in a responsible manner and to exercise restraint in conduct of its deterrence
policy.
Pakistan, he said, also wants to ensure that its nuclear
capability does not pose any threat to non-nuclear weapon states in the region.
Pakistan's nuclear capability is very clear for deterrence
of aggression and defense of its sovereignty, the author said.
India's declared nuclear doctrine, he said, is based on a
posture of no first use of nuclear weapons. India, however, retains the option
of using nuclear weapons in retaliation against a nuclear, biological or
chemical attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.
India's doctrine contains an inbuilt offensive design. The
most dangerous aspect of this policy is that it keeps the option open for a
conventional war against Pakistan, according to the author.
Asked why Pakistan had used the option of a limited
conventional war in Kargil in 1999, the author said Kargil is part of Siachen
sector where limited battles have continued since 1984. Kargil, he said, was a
continuation of the same ongoing skirmishes between India and Pakistan.
The author then explains various options India may exercise
for launching a limited conventional war against Pakistan. These include:
-- Surgical strikes conducted along the Line of Control in
Kashmir against Pakistani troops and jihadi camps, which India says Pakistan is
running on its side of Kashmir.
The Indians have already attacked along the LoC to prevent
Kashmiri fighters from crossing into Indian Kashmir but never succeeded in
acquiring the desired results. So far, India only uses artillery for launching
these surgical strikes into Pakistani Kashmir but under the new strategy they
will also use air strikes for hitting targets across the LoC.
-- Hot pursuits that include physically crossing the LoC
and battling envisaged jihadi camps or capturing certain areas. It is an open
option, says the author. In any war scenario, India can use it."
But if they do so, Pakistan is not going to sit quiet. It
will be an act of war which will not remain limited and it can escalate to a
full-scale war and ultimately it can lead to a nuclear conflict if Pakistan's
national interests are threatened, the author warns.
-- Cold start strategy for which India has been raising
eight to 10 combat groups to implement this new strategy. Each group will
include forces from the army and the air force and, if required, from the navy.
Each combat group will have a hard-hitting force of
3,000-4,000 troops and it should be able to achieve its objective in 72 hours,
before Pakistan reacts or approaches the international community.
The author says that Pakistan will not view an attack by
this new force as a limited war. For us it will be a full-scale war, and
Pakistan will respond with full resources, and if we fail to contain the
Indians, the nuclear factor will definitely come in.
Explaining how a conventional war can lead to a nuclear
conflict, the author says: In a full conventional war, India has the potential
to create impact. And if it does so, it will force Pakistan to use its nuclear
option.
Before the two countries acquired nuclear capability,
India's strategy was to invade Pakistan and divide it into north and south. By
severing all links between the two parts of the country, India hoped to force
Pakistan to negotiate peace on New Delhi's terms.
The Indians, the author said, also are considering a number
of other options for launching a fast but effective incursion into Pakistan
without causing a full-scale war.
But in the final analysis, he said, all options to initiate
war by India may look independent and workable but ultimately will lead to the
same destination which both sides would like to avoid as responsible nuclear states.