Monday, 9 September 2013

List of Compulsory and Optional Subjects for CSS Examination

LIST OF SUBJECTS FOR CSS




Compulsory Subjects
Subject
Marks
Essay
100
English Precis and Composition
100
General Knowledge (300)
-
1- Everyday Science
100
2- Current Affairs
100
3- Pakistan Affairs
100
Islamiat
100

Total
600






 Optional Subjects
Subjects carrying a total of 600 marks to be selected


Group-A
Subjects
Marks
Accountancy & Auditing
200
Economics
200
Business Administration
100
Public Administration
100
Subjects carrying not more than 200 marks can be opted.
Note: Business Administration cannot be opted in combination with Public Administration

Group-B
Subjects
Marks
Political Science
200
Agriculture
100
Forestry
100
Sociology
100
Journalism
100
Subjects carrying not more than 200 marks can be opted.

Group-C
Subjects
Marks
200
200
100
100
Subjects carrying not more than 200 marks can be opted.

Group-D
(Science Subjects)
Subjects
Marks
Physics
200
Geology
200
Geography
200
Chemistry
200
Botany
200
Zoology
200
Subjects carrying not more than 200 marks can be opted.

Group-E
(History Subjects)
Subjects
Marks
200
200
200
200
100
Subjects carrying not more than 200 marks can be opted.

Group-F
Subjects
Marks
Law
200
Constitutional Law
100
Mercantile Law
100
Muslim Law & Jurisprudence
100
International Law
100
International Relations
100
Subjects carrying not more than 200 marks can be opted.
Note: International Law CANNOT BE opted in combination with International Relations.

Group-G
Subjects
Marks
Philosophy
200
Psychology including Experimental Psychology
200
Subjects carrying not more than 200 marks can be opted.

Group-H
(Regional Languages)
Subjects
Marks
Sindhi
100
Pushto
100
Punjabi
100
Balochi
100
Subjects carrying not more than 100 marks can be opted.
Note: Not more than one of the 4 subjects can be opted.

Group-I
(National & Foreign Languages)
Subjects
Marks
English Literature
200
Urdu
200
Persian
200
Arabic
200
Subjects carrying not more than 200 marks can be opted.
Not more than one of the 4 subjects can be opted.
Note: Urdu can not be combined with Regional Languages.

DANGER OF A NUCLEAR WAR --- A Sample Essay





DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR IN THE YEARS TO COME--- A Sample Essay

Introduction:
The use of atom bomb in the World War-II created a sense of insecurity among the weaker nations around the globe. This freakish (unusual, strange) obsession (phobia) culminated into (reach its highest or final point ) the development of a new kind of weapons called “Nuclear Weapons”. The fear of being erased further deepened when atomic weapons started serving as commodities (product that can be sold) of strategic, political and economic commerce. The United States of America started the atomic age about 60 years ago, on August 6 and 9, 1945, when it dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then, not only bomb-surviving victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also the peace loving people of the world have strongly opposed the existence of nuclear weapons. The world would truly be a better place to live in if there were no weapons whatsoever. The atomic weapons increase the tension and the acceleration of violence among the countries of the world. Global concern for the use of atomic weapons is multidimensional and should be taken as merely an effort for non-proliferation. These horrendous (horrible) weapons have the capacity in them to destroy millions of people in a matter of moments.

Nuclear Age:

A nuclear war is one, which is fought not with the conventional weapons but with the nuclear ones. The history of the world has seen only once the use of nuclear weapons and it was sui generis. It was back in August 1945 when America dropped nuclear weapons on Heroshima and Nagasaki, the bad luck cities of japan, during the second World War. Millions of people were killed in a seconds and those who survived rendered disabled. Even up to this day, the births in those regions are abnormal

During the World War II, America inaugurated the nuclear age by dropping the atomic bomb on Japan, this age passed through the Cold War with its indirect conflicts between the nuclear superpowers, to the present age when fear of nuclear attack has been shifted to a fear of rogue states and terrorists. The fear generated by the idea that nuclear war is possible and every conflict on nuclear tensions may lead the world to nuclear conflagration (a great and destructive fire) is not baseless. One important element having great import and influence throughout the nuclear age is the group of professionals who guides nuclear policy and who develops all strategy on the basis of the perceived nuclear threat. These professionals are sometimes referred to as the priesthood. Every action on the part of the nuclear powers is tied to the nuclear threat.
On August 6, 1945, the United States exploded an untested uranium-235 gun-assembly bomb, nicknamed "Little Boy," 1,900 feet above Hiroshima. The city was home to an estimated 350,000 people; about 140,000 died by the end of the year. Three days later, at 11:02 am, the United States exploded a plutonium implosion bomb nicknamed "Fat Man" 1,650 feet above Nagasaki. About 70,000 of the estimated 270,000 residents died by the end of the year.


Nuclear Deterrence:
            The advent of nuclear weapons changed the approach to foreign policy and diplomatic relations for many countries. During the period known as the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured destruction helped prevent the outbreak (sudden eruption of war, disease etc.) of full-scale nuclear war. However, while nuclear weapons have prevented wars in which the mutual destruction of the combatants is assured, nuclear weapons have not prevented wars where nuclear weapons are not used. In fact, recent wars like the Iraq-America, Afghan-America Wars were primarily undertaken by the United States of America because of the threat of nuclear weapons falling into enemy hands. As such, while nuclear weapons have influenced military and foreign policy and diplomatic relations among nations, they have seldom prevented wars from occurring (take place) that do not rely on them. In fact, over the past 34 years, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enacted in 1970, has not been successful in putting and end to state development of nuclear weapons.
                             

Threat of Nuclear War:

            Many things relating to nuclear proliferation have changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the declared nuclear powers, to worldwide tensions and so-called “Hot Spots”, the nuclear situation has changed dramatically over the years. Some would say that the threat of a nuclear war has gone down in today’s post Soviet society. They are, of course, wrong. The threat of a nuclear war is greater now that the cold war is over because, more nations have nuclear warheads, the smuggling of nuclear materials is on the rise, and nuclear treaties are ineffective.
Many nations have nuclear warheads. While this could be construed as a bad thing, many nuclear powers do not adhere to the old ‘us and them’ theory. It is no longer a fight between the communist and capitalist societies. While more nations have the technology to make nuclear warheads, many do not due to political pressure. The most common reason for the development of nuclear warheads is to prove a said nation’s ability to do so. For example, South Africa developed the technology to produce nuclear missiles, and then dismantled them. (1) In doing so it became the first nation to voluntarily giving up its nuclear missiles.
SOME TOPICS IN THIS ESSAY:
            Soviet Union, India Pakistan, United Russia, START II, NPT Russia, Alexander Lebed, Weapons Inspectors, South Africa, United Nations, North Korea, nuclear warheads, soviet union, cold war, nuclear material, nuclear war, nuclear powers, threat nuclear war, threat nuclear, nuclear weapons, collapse soviet union, material left, proliferation nuclear, war cold war, nations nuclear warheads, nuclear war cold,

Consequences of the Threat of Nuclear War:
            The Earth contains over six billion people and of these approximately 240 million are attempting to flee war, persecution poverty, and environmental degradation. While progress has been made, turbulence (disturbance) continues in the Middle East, Africa, South and Central Asia, and parts of Southeast Asia. Problems need to be resolved to end mass destruction and terrorist attacks.
People are on the move to escape war. On this list are distinguished physicists (person skilled or qualified in physics) who served to fight the spread of war with the production of atomic bombs and nuclear weapons. By the end of Word War II, Europe contained over 40 million displaced persons. The end of the Cold War began a new phase in politics but armed camps continue to exist. Economic and political conflicts are common among major nations of the world and problems of poverty and starvation continue. People continue to fight to gain economic development and political freedom. While the United States defense industry has adjusted to the end of the Cold War and remains technically strong and financially healthy, it continues to face threats to national security ahead. A study is needed to more fully understand war views within a social psychological perspective. Social psychology seeks to identify and examine relationships among attitudes. Johnson, Handler and Criss proposed that the individual and their social system are mutually supportive and cultural beliefs serve to perpetuate war attitudes. For example, ethnic prejudice generated and supported by cultural beliefs may translate into enemy images. In this case anti-Muslim attitudes may be generalized to national enemy images, which support war acceptance attitudes. A study is needed to help identify and understand the attitudes that support war acceptance beliefs, in order to provide information necessary for the generation of concrete strategies for changing these beliefs. Purpose of the Study The purpose of the study is to explore attitudes and beliefs towards war, nationalism, internationalism.

Some common words found in the essay are:
Handler Criss, Hyams Bartholomew, Study Adults, United Soviet∆≥, Theoretical Framework, Silverstein Holt, United Kingdom, Cold War, Images Enemy, Organization Research, war acceptance, enemy images, war acceptance attitudes, acceptance attitudes, johnson handler criss, johnson handler, handler criss, handler criss 1987, criss 1987, social psychology, support war, nationalism internationalism, support war acceptance, related war acceptance, chemical biological

The Cold War:          
            One historian defines the Cold War as period of East-West competition, tension, and conflict short of full-scale war, characterized by mutual perceptions of hostile intention between military-political alliances or blocs. Both the United States and the Soviet Union share the responsibility for the start and continuation of the Cold War in the period between 1945 and 1963.
            During World War II, the U.S. and the Soviets were allies committed to the defeat of mutual enemies - Japan and Germany. At the end of the War, as the allies struggled to reconfigure (re-arrangement) the European polity and establish a new order in the East, the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States came into direct collision. For western leaders and their diplomats, World War II had a successful but hardly "neat" ending; too many questions were left unanswered, such as the future of Poland and Germany, which had been opened at Yalta and Potsdam but left unresolved. For the allies of the West, Soviet determination to retain physical and political control over territories captured during the War was suspect. Had Russia liberated Eastern Europe, or merely replaced Germany as its master? That was the critical question being asked in 1945; Truman and others in the West objected to Stalin's plans to retain control of Poland.
The Marshall Plan was another Cold War American response to perceived potentials for communist aggression; in this Plan, the U.S. provided billions of dollars of aid to European Allies. American policy vis-a-vis the Soviets focused on "containment," or maintenance of existing Soviet borders via an American policy combining political, military and economic elements. The Berlin Airlift, enacted after Stalin attempted to cut off the Western-controlled sector of Berlin, demonstrated Western resolve and determination. These events, however, tended to increase tensions. The entire period from 1945 to 1963 was a period in which both the U.S. and the Soviets attempted to sway world opinion and attract the loyalty and support of other countries by providing funds and other material support. The threat of the bomb and Soviet possession of the bomb was of enormous significance in shaping American foreign policy and increasing American fears of the "Russian Bear." With China finally in the communist "camp," American fears increased dramatically; a "Red scare" at home, fueled by Joe McCarthy and his Congressional investigation, added to domestic tensions and fears. China's "defection" in spite of massive American aid to nationalist Chiang Ka

During the Cold War era, tensions between east and west, conflict short of full-scale war, and a major superpower arms race characterized conditions among major nations with nuclear weapons. Until the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, tensions continued between the superpowers with respect to nuclear weapons, but the official stance among nations like the U.S. and former Soviet Union was one of peaceful coexistence. However, the Cold War tensions and events like the Cuban Missile Crisis prompted governmetal agreement. When George Bush explained his justification for going to war against Iraq, he cited Iraq∆≥ intention to build and deploy Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) as his main reason for the war. In this sense, nuclear weapons prompted the outbreak of war rather than deterring it. The challenges facing the NPT demonstrate that nuclear arms capability has not deterred war. Currently both North Korea and Iran are being monitored for nuclear weapons capability and buildup. The NPT was designed as a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, and to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is also designed to ?ther the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament,?nited p. 1). Included in NPT provisions is a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through IAEA inspections. The NPT is reviewed every five years by its signatories (United p. 1). Despite such safeguards and attempts to promote nuclear disarmament, nations continue to attempt to gain nuclear weapons capability from Pakistan to North Korea. In January, 2003, the go

The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict
between India and Pakistan

            The months-long military standoff between India and Pakistan intensified several weeks ago when terrorists killed many people during their attack on Taj Mahal Hotel, Mumbai. According to the research of Pentagon, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan can result in 12 million deaths. Most of the possible war scenarios focus on Kashmir where most international observers believe even a small conflict has the potential of escalating into a full-fledged war.
NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council) of USA has conducted its own analysis of the consequences of nuclear war in South Asia. Prior to this most recent crisis, it calculated two nuclear scenarios. The first assumes 10 Hiroshima-sized explosions with no fallout (radioactive debris (waste) caused by a nuclear explosion); the second assumes 24 nuclear explosions with significant radioactive fallout. Below is a discussion of the two scenarios in detail and an exploration of several additional issues regarding nuclear war in South Asia.

Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Forces:

It is difficult to determine the actual size and composition of India's and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, but NRDC estimates that both countries have a total of 50 to 75 weapons. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we believe India has about 30 to 35 nuclear warheads, slightly fewer than Pakistan, which may have as many as 48.
Both countries have fission weapons, similar to the early designs developed by the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s. NRDC estimates their explosive yields are 5 to 25 kilotons (1 kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT). By comparison, the yield of the weapon the United States exploded over Hiroshima was 15 kilotons, while the bomb exploded over Nagasaki was 21 kilotons. According to a recent NRDC discussion with a senior Pakistani military official, Pakistan's main nuclear weapons are mounted on missiles. India's nuclear weapons are reportedly gravity bombs deployed on fighter aircraft.
For the first scenario NRDC used casualty data from the Hiroshima bomb to estimate what would happen if bombs exploded over 10 large South Asian cities: five in India and five in Pakistan. The 15-kiloton yield of the Hiroshima weapon is approximately the size of the weapons now in the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals. If nuclear weapons are dropped on five big cities of each country the estimated death toll would about 2,862,581 people who would die on the spot and 1,506,859 would get injured severely.
Ten Hiroshima-size explosions over 10 major cities in India and Pakistan would kill as many as three to four times more people per bomb than in Japan because of the higher urban densities in Indian and Pakistani cities.
NRDC calculated that 22.1 million people in India and Pakistan would be exposed to lethal radiation doses of 600 rem or more in the first two days after the attack. Another 8 million people would receive a radiation dose of 100 to 600 rem, causing severe radiation sickness and potentially death, especially for the very young, old or infirm. NRDC calculates that as many as 30 million people would be threatened by the fallout from the attack, roughly divided between the two countries.
Besides fallout, blast and fire would cause substantial destruction within roughly a mile-and-a-half of the bomb craters. NRDC estimates that 8.1 million people live within this radius of destruction.
Most Indians (99 percent of the population) and Pakistanis (93 percent of the population) would survive the second scenario. Their respective military forces would be still be intact to continue and even escalate the conflict.
After India and Pakistan held nuclear tests in 1998, experts have debated whether their nuclear weapons contribute to stability in South Asia. Experts who argue that the nuclear standoff promotes stability have pointed to the U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War as an example of how deterrence ensures military restraint.
Differences between the Cold War and the current South Asian crisis
There are major differences between the Cold War and the current South Asian crisis. Unlike the U.S.-Soviet experience, these two countries have a deep-seated hatred of one another and have fought three wars since both countries became independent. At least part of the current crisis may be seen as Hindu extremism versus Muslim nationalism.
2.         A second difference is India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are much smaller than those of the United States and Russia. The U.S. and Russian arsenals truly represent the capability to destroy each other's society beyond recovery. While the two South Asia scenarios we have described produce unimaginable loss of life and destruction, they do not reach the level of "mutual assured destruction" that stood as the ultimate deterrent during the Cold War.


3.         No conventional war between India and Pakistan will remain limited for long time and will gradually lead to a full-scale war and ultimately to a nuclear conflict, warns a study by a Pakistani defense official.
4.         The study by the Pakistani defense official envisages possible Pakistani response to a various proposals being discussed in India's defense circles for dealing with the Kashmir insurgency, which India blames on Pakistan-backed militants.
But the author warns that what India may see as a limited conventional war, may not be accepted to Pakistan as such. Similarly, what India defines as limited political perspective, may have a different implication for Pakistan, he adds.
The author points out that most Western analysts and scholars are not comfortable with India's limited war doctrine and they also believe that a limited war between India and Pakistan cannot remain limited for long.
Comparing nuclear policies of the two countries, the author says that the central theme of Pakistan's nuclear policy guidelines is to act in a responsible manner and to exercise restraint in conduct of its deterrence policy.
Pakistan, he said, also wants to ensure that its nuclear capability does not pose any threat to non-nuclear weapon states in the region.
Pakistan's nuclear capability is very clear for deterrence of aggression and defense of its sovereignty, the author said.
India's declared nuclear doctrine, he said, is based on a posture of no first use of nuclear weapons. India, however, retains the option of using nuclear weapons in retaliation against a nuclear, biological or chemical attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.
India's doctrine contains an inbuilt offensive design. The most dangerous aspect of this policy is that it keeps the option open for a conventional war against Pakistan, according to the author.
Asked why Pakistan had used the option of a limited conventional war in Kargil in 1999, the author said Kargil is part of Siachen sector where limited battles have continued since 1984. Kargil, he said, was a continuation of the same ongoing skirmishes between India and Pakistan.
The author then explains various options India may exercise for launching a limited conventional war against Pakistan. These include:
-- Surgical strikes conducted along the Line of Control in Kashmir against Pakistani troops and jihadi camps, which India says Pakistan is running on its side of Kashmir.
The Indians have already attacked along the LoC to prevent Kashmiri fighters from crossing into Indian Kashmir but never succeeded in acquiring the desired results. So far, India only uses artillery for launching these surgical strikes into Pakistani Kashmir but under the new strategy they will also use air strikes for hitting targets across the LoC.
-- Hot pursuits that include physically crossing the LoC and battling envisaged jihadi camps or capturing certain areas. It is an open option, says the author. In any war scenario, India can use it."
But if they do so, Pakistan is not going to sit quiet. It will be an act of war which will not remain limited and it can escalate to a full-scale war and ultimately it can lead to a nuclear conflict if Pakistan's national interests are threatened, the author warns.
-- Cold start strategy for which India has been raising eight to 10 combat groups to implement this new strategy. Each group will include forces from the army and the air force and, if required, from the navy.
Each combat group will have a hard-hitting force of 3,000-4,000 troops and it should be able to achieve its objective in 72 hours, before Pakistan reacts or approaches the international community.
The author says that Pakistan will not view an attack by this new force as a limited war. For us it will be a full-scale war, and Pakistan will respond with full resources, and if we fail to contain the Indians, the nuclear factor will definitely come in.
Explaining how a conventional war can lead to a nuclear conflict, the author says: In a full conventional war, India has the potential to create impact. And if it does so, it will force Pakistan to use its nuclear option.
Before the two countries acquired nuclear capability, India's strategy was to invade Pakistan and divide it into north and south. By severing all links between the two parts of the country, India hoped to force Pakistan to negotiate peace on New Delhi's terms.
The Indians, the author said, also are considering a number of other options for launching a fast but effective incursion into Pakistan without causing a full-scale war.
But in the final analysis, he said, all options to initiate war by India may look independent and workable but ultimately will lead to the same destination which both sides would like to avoid as responsible nuclear states.


Do Nuclear Weapons Pose a Serious Threat?
Introduction
For over fifty years the “doomsday clock” has symbolized the threat that nuclear weapons pose to the world. The clock has appeared at various times on the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a magazine about global security that was founded at the end of World War II by the scientists who developed the atomic bomb. Monitoring the clock is the responsibility of the Bulletin’s scientists and international affairs experts, who move its hands forward or backward depending on international events. When things go well, such as the signing of an arms control agreement, the hands move farther from midnight, which represents nuclear holocaust. When things go poorly, such as when a nation tests a nuclear weapon for the first time, the hands move closer to midnight.
On February 27, 2002, the clock’s guardians moved the minute hand of the clock forward, from nine to seven minutes to midnight, only the third time in the history of the clock that the hand has moved forward. In explaining their decision, the Bulletin’s board of directors said that the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks should have been a “global wake-up call” about serious threats to global security. Yet as Bulletin editor Linda Rothstein explains, “Even . . . after September 11, many of us—and much of the U.S. media—remain disturbingly disengaged from the rest of the world.” The magazine’s directors report that “moving the clock’s hands at this time reflects our growing concern that the international community has hit the ‘snooze’ button rather than respond to the alarm.” Moreover, although the September 11 attacks prompted the United States to wage a war against terrorism to reduce the chances that a terrorist group would attack America with weapons of mass destruction, many security experts argue that America is one of the main culprits making such an event likely to happen. Indeed, many analysts believe that America’s actions— before and after September 11—have made the world less safe for all nations, including the United States.
Experts cite several key reasons why they have fingered America as a nuclear threat. To begin with, they point out, 95 percent of the world’s thirty-one thousand nuclear weapons are located in the United States and Russia, with sixteen thousand of those operationally deployed. In addition, most of the U.S. weapons that have been removed from the active stockpile have not been dismantled but stored for possible future use. The United States will retain a stockpile of over ten thousand warheads well into the future.
Another fact that worries scientists and security experts is that U.S. weapons labs are now refining old weapons and designing new ones. For example, weapons scientists are designing “bunker busters,” nuclear weapons designed to penetrate deeply buried targets in order to destroy weapons labs and storage facilities dug deep into the mountains of hostile nations. Many arms experts contend that building more nuclear weapons—no matter what type—is simply fostering nuclear proliferation and further endangering global security.
The United States also continues to stockpile nearly 750 metric tons of weapon-grade uranium and 85 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium. Since America has never satisfactorily kept track of these materials, many critics claim, it is impossible to verify if all of it is accounted for. Many commentators worry that some of this material may be migrating into the hands of terrorists, who could use it to build “dirty bombs,” conventional explosives packed with nuclear materials that could be used against the United States.
Developments on the international front have experts worried as well. One of the most serious concerns is America’s 2001 withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which prohibited the United States and Russia from developing space- and ground-based defensive nuclear weapons. The Bush administration believes that a missile defense system, capable of destroying enemy missiles in the air, is crucial to protect the U.S. homeland from nuclear attack; since the treaty did not allow America to develop such a system, the administration felt it necessary to quit the treaty. However, critics point out that the launching of a missile defense system will only encourage other nations to develop weapons to defeat it, leading to arms proliferation.
Another international diplomacy failure on the part of the United States, according to those concerned about global security, is President George W. Bush’s provocative speech in which he named Iran, Iraq, and North Korea the “axis of evil” in part because of their attempts to develop nuclear weapons. Bush put these nations on notice that America would not sit idle while they pursued the development of weapons of mass destruction. Many commentators believe that this veiled threat will only force these nations and others to develop nuclear arms as protection against an aggressive America.
For these reasons the guardians of the doomsday clock insist that before they can move the hands of the clock farther from midnight, the United States must seriously reexamine its nuclear policies. The authors in At Issue: Do Nuclear Weapons Pose a Serious Threat? discuss the extent of the nuclear danger facing the world today and debate the best methods for enhancing nuclear security. The doomsday clock is a clear indicator that a reassessment of current nuclear dangers is vital. As Bulletin analysts put it, “The clock is ticking.”


The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan
NRDC's nuclear experts think about the unthinkable, using state-of-the-art nuclear war simulation software to assess the crisis in South Asia.
The months-long military standoff between India and Pakistan intensified several weeks ago when suspected Islamic militants killed more than 30 people at an Indian base in the disputed territory of Kashmir. As U.S. diplomatic pressure to avert war intensifies, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is going to India and Pakistan this week to discuss with his South Asian counterparts the results of a classified Pentagon study that concludes that a nuclear war between these countries could result in 12 million deaths.
NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council) has conducted its own analysis of the consequences of nuclear war in South Asia. Prior to this most recent crisis we calculated two nuclear scenarios. The first assumes 10 Hiroshima-sized explosions with no fallout; the second assumes 24 nuclear explosions with significant radioactive fallout. Below is a discussion of the two scenarios in detail and an exploration of several additional issues regarding nuclear war in South Asia.
Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Forces
It is difficult to determine the actual size and composition of India's and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, but NRDC estimates that both countries have a total of 50 to 75 weapons. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we believe India has about 30 to 35 nuclear warheads, slightly fewer than Pakistan, which may have as many as 48.
Both countries have fission weapons, similar to the early designs developed by the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s. NRDC estimates their explosive yields are 5 to 25 kilotons (1 kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT). By comparison, the yield of the weapon the United States exploded over Hiroshima was 15 kilotons, while the bomb exploded over Nagasaki was 21 kilotons. According to a recent NRDC discussion with a senior Pakistani military official, Pakistan's main nuclear weapons are mounted on missiles. India's nuclear weapons are reportedly gravity bombs deployed on fighter aircraft.
NRDC's Nuclear Program initially developed the software used to calculate the consequences of a South Asian nuclear war to examine and analyze the U.S. nuclear war planning process. We combined Department of Energy and Department of Defense computer codes with meteorological and demographic data to model what would happen in various kinds of attacks using different types of weapons. Our June 2001 report, "The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time for Change," is available at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/warplan/index.asp.
Scenario: 10 Bombs on 10 South Asian Cities
For our first scenario we used casualty data from the Hiroshima bomb to estimate what would happen if bombs exploded over 10 large South Asian cities: five in India and five in Pakistan. (The results were published in "The Risks and Consequences of Nuclear War in South Asia," by NRDC physicist Matthew McKinzie and Princeton scientists Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar and M. V. Ramana, a chapter in Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian (editors), "Out of the Nuclear Shadow" (Dehli: Lokayan and Rainbow Publishers, 2001).)
The 15-kiloton yield of the Hiroshima weapon is approximately the size of the weapons now in the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals. The deaths and severe injuries experienced at Hiroshima were mainly a function of how far people were from ground zero. Other factors included whether people were in buildings or outdoors, the structural characteristics of the buildings themselves, and the age and health of the victims at the time of the attack. The closer to ground zero, the higher fatality rate. Further away there were fewer fatalities and larger numbers of injuries. The table below summarizes the first nuclear war scenario by superimposing the Hiroshima data onto five Indian and five Pakistan cities with densely concentrated populations.
Estimated nuclear casualties for attacks on 10 large Indian and Pakistani cities




City Name
Total Population Within 5 Kilometers of Ground Zero
Number of Persons Killed
Number of Persons Severely Injured
Number of Persons Slightly Injured
India




Bangalore
3,077,937
314,978
175,136
411,336
Bombay
3,143,284
477,713
228,648
476,633
Calcutta
3,520,344
357,202
198,218
466,336
Madras
3,252,628
364,291
196,226
448,948
New Delhi
1,638,744
176,518
94,231
217,853
Total India
14,632,937
1,690,702
892,459
2,021,106
Pakistan




Faisalabad
2,376,478
336,239
174,351
373,967
Islamabad
798,583
154,067
66,744
129,935
Karachi
1,962,458
239,643
126,810
283,290
Lahore
2,682,092
258,139
149,649
354,095
Rawalpindi
1,589,828
183,791
96,846
220,585
Total Pakistan
9,409,439
1,171,879
614,400
1,361,872
India and Pakistan




Total
24,042,376
2,862,581
1,506,859
3,382,978
As in the case of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in this scenario the 10 bombs over Indian and Pakistani cities would be exploded in the air, which maximized blast damage and fire but creates no fallout. On August 6, 1945, the United States exploded an untested uranium-235 gun-assembly bomb, nicknamed "Little Boy," 1,900 feet above Hiroshima. The city was home to an estimated 350,000 people; about 140,000 died by the end of the year. Three days later, at 11:02 am, the United States exploded a plutonium implosion bomb nicknamed "Fat Man" 1,650 feet above Nagasaki. About 70,000 of the estimated 270,000 residents died by the end of the year.
Ten Hiroshima-size explosions over 10 major cities in India and Pakistan would kill as many as three to four times more people per bomb than in Japan because of the higher urban densities in Indian and Pakistani cities.
Scenario: 24 Ground Bursts
In January, NRDC calculated the consequences of a much more severe nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. It first appeared as a sidebar in the January 14, 2002, issue of Newsweek ("A Face-Off with Nuclear Stakes"). This scenario calculated the consequences of 24 nuclear explosions detonated on the ground -- unlike the Hiroshima airburst -- resulting in significant amounts of lethal radioactive fallout.
Exploding a nuclear bomb above the ground does not produce fallout. For example, the United States detonated "Little Boy" weapon above Hiroshima at an altitude of 1,900 feet. At this height, the radioactive particles produced in the explosion were small and light enough to rise into the upper atmosphere, where they were carried by the prevailing winds. Days to weeks later, after the radioactive bomb debris became less "hot," these tiny particles descended to earth as a measurable radioactive residue, but not at levels of contamination that would cause immediate radiation sickness or death.
Unfortunately, it is easier to fuse a nuclear weapon to detonate on impact than it is to detonate it in the air -- and that means fallout. If the nuclear explosion takes place at or near the surface of the earth, the nuclear fireball would gouge out material and mix it with the radioactive bomb debris, producing heavier radioactive particles. These heavier particles would begin to drift back to earth within minutes or hours after the explosion, producing potentially lethal levels of nuclear fallout out to tens or hundreds of kilometers from the ground zero. The precise levels depend on the explosive yield of the weapon and the prevailing winds.
For the second scenario, we calculated the fallout patterns and casualties for a hypothetical nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each country targeted major cities. We chose target cities throughout Pakistan and in northwestern India to take into account the limited range of Pakistani missiles or aircraft. The target cities, listed in the table below, include the capitals of Islamabad and New Dehli, and large cities, such as Karachi and Bombay. In this scenario, we assumed that a dozen, 25-kiloton warheads would be detonated as ground bursts in Pakistan and another dozen in India, producing substantial fallout.
The devastation that would result from fallout would exceed that of blast and fire. NRDC's second scenario would produce far more horrific results than the first scenario because there would be more weapons, higher yields, and extensive fallout. In some large cities, we assumed more than one bomb would be used.
15 Indian and Pakistani cities attacked with 24 nuclear warheads



Country
City
City Population
Number of
Attacking Bombs
Pakistan
Islamabad (national capital)
100-250 thousand
1
Pakistan
Karachi (provincial capital)
> 5 million
3
Pakistan
Lahore (provincial capital)
1-5 million
2
Pakistan
Peshawar (provincial capital)
0.5-1 million
1
Pakistan
Quetta (provincial capital)
250-500 thousand
1
Pakistan
Faisalabad
1-5 million
2
Pakistan
Hyderabad
0.5-1 million
1
Pakistan
Rawalpindi
0.5-1 million
1
India
New Dehli (national capital)
250-500 thousand
1
India
Bombay (provincial capital)
> 5 million
3
India
Delhi (provincial capital)
> 5 million
3
India
Jaipur (provincial capital)
1-5 million
2
India
Bhopal (provincial capital)
1-5 million
1
India
Ahmadabad
1-5 million
1
India
Pune
1-5 million
1
NRDC calculated that 22.1 million people in India and Pakistan would be exposed to lethal radiation doses of 600 rem or more in the first two days after the attack. Another 8 million people would receive a radiation dose of 100 to 600 rem, causing severe radiation sickness and potentially death, especially for the very young, old or infirm. NRDC calculates that as many as 30 million people would be threatened by the fallout from the attack, roughly divided between the two countries.
Besides fallout, blast and fire would cause substantial destruction within roughly a mile-and-a-half of the bomb craters. NRDC estimates that 8.1 million people live within this radius of destruction.
Most Indians (99 percent of the population) and Pakistanis (93 percent of the population) would survive the second scenario. Their respective military forces would be still be intact to continue and even escalate the conflict.
Thinking the Unthinkable
After India and Pakistan held nuclear tests in 1998, experts have debated whether their nuclear weapons contribute to stability in South Asia. Experts who argue that the nuclear standoff promotes stability have pointed to the U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War as an example of how deterrence ensures military restraint.
NRDC disagrees. There are major differences between the Cold War and the current South Asian crisis. Unlike the U.S.-Soviet experience, these two countries have a deep-seated hatred of one another and have fought three wars since both countries became independent. At least part of the current crisis may be seen as Hindu nationalism versus Muslim fundamentalism.
A second difference is India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are much smaller than those of the United States and Russia. The U.S. and Russian arsenals truly represent the capability to destroy each other's society beyond recovery. While the two South Asia scenarios we have described produce unimaginable loss of life and destruction, they do not reach the level of "mutual assured destruction" that stood as the ultimate deterrent during the Cold War.
The two South Asian scenarios assume nuclear attacks against cities. During the early Cold War period this was the deterrent strategy of the United States and the Soviet Union. But as both countries introduced technological improvements into their arsenals, they pursued other strategies, targeting each other's nuclear forces, conventional military forces, industry and leadership. India and Pakistan may include these types of targets in their current military planning. For example, attacking large dams with nuclear weapons could result in massive disruption, economic consequences and casualties. Concentrations of military forces and facilities may provide tempting targets as well.


Nuclear War A Real Fear In South Asia

From political games to deadly games, the nuclear option always remains open for ANY of the 10 nations who already have the Bomb.
Washington (UPI) Dec 17 2004
No conventional war between India and Pakistan will remain limited for long and will gradually lead to a full-scale war and ultimately to a nuclear conflict, warns a study by a Pakistani defense official.
The study, presented recently at a Washington think-tank, looks at various scenarios that could lead to an all-out war between the two South Asian neighbors, which conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998 and also possess nuclear-capable missiles.
India and Pakistan have fought three wars since their independence from Britain in 1947 and are still engaged in 57-year-old conflict in the Himalayan valley of Kashmir which caused two of these three wars.
Most of the possible war scenarios discussed in this study also focus on Kashmir where most international observers believe even a small conflict has the potential of escalating into a full-fledged war.
Recently, both India and Pakistan have agreed to resolve their differences through dialogue and have taken several steps lessen tensions.
The study by the Pakistani defense official envisages possible Pakistani response to a various proposals being discussed in India's defense circles for dealing with the Kashmir insurgency, which India blames on Pakistan-backed militants.
The author, who wished not to be identified, argues that recently India has put forward the concept of a limited conventional war aimed at achieving a specific political objective, such as putting down the uprising in Kashmir.
But the author warns that what India may see as a limited conventional war, may not be accepted to Pakistan as such. Similarly, what India defines as limited political perspective, may have a different implication for Pakistan, he adds.
The author points out that most Western analysts and scholars are not comfortable with India's limited war doctrine and they also believe that a limited war between India and Pakistan cannot remain limited for long.
Comparing nuclear policies of the two countries, the author says that the central theme of Pakistan's nuclear policy guidelines is to act in a responsible manner and to exercise restraint in conduct of its deterrence policy.
Pakistan, he said, also wants to ensure that its nuclear capability does not pose any threat to non-nuclear weapon states in the region.
Pakistan's nuclear capability is very clear for deterrence of aggression and defense of its sovereignty, the author said.
India's declared nuclear doctrine, he said, is based on a posture of no first use of nuclear weapons. India, however, retains the option of using nuclear weapons in retaliation against a nuclear, biological or chemical attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.
India's doctrine contains an inbuilt offensive design. The most dangerous aspect of this policy is that it keeps the option open for a conventional war against Pakistan, according to the author.
Asked why Pakistan had used the option of a limited conventional war in Kargil in 1999, the author said Kargil is part of Siachen sector where limited battles have continued since 1984. Kargil, he said, was a continuation of the same ongoing skirmishes between India and Pakistan.
The author then explains various options India may exercise for launching a limited conventional war against Pakistan. These include:
-- Surgical strikes conducted along the Line of Control in Kashmir against Pakistani troops and jihadi camps, which India says Pakistan is running on its side of Kashmir.
The Indians have already attacked along the LoC to prevent Kashmiri fighters from crossing into Indian Kashmir but never succeeded in acquiring the desired results. So far, India only uses artillery for launching these surgical strikes into Pakistani Kashmir but under the new strategy they will also use air strikes for hitting targets across the LoC.
-- Hot pursuits that include physically crossing the LoC and battling envisaged jihadi camps or capturing certain areas. It is an open option, says the author. In any war scenario, India can use it."
But if they do so, Pakistan is not going to sit quiet. It will be an act of war which will not remain limited and it can escalate to a full-scale war and ultimately it can lead to a nuclear conflict if Pakistan's national interests are threatened, the author warns.
-- Cold start strategy for which India has been raising eight to 10 combat groups to implement this new strategy. Each group will include forces from the army and the air force and, if required, from the navy.
Each combat group will have a hard-hitting force of 3,000-4,000 troops and it should be able to achieve its objective in 72 hours, before Pakistan reacts or approaches the international community.
The author says that Pakistan will not view an attack by this new force as a limited war. For us it will be a full-scale war, and Pakistan will respond with full resources, and if we fail to contain the Indians, the nuclear factor will definitely come in.
Explaining how a conventional war can lead to a nuclear conflict, the author says: In a full conventional war, India has the potential to create impact. And if it does so, it will force Pakistan to use its nuclear option.
Before the two countries acquired nuclear capability, India's strategy was to invade Pakistan and divide it into north and south. By severing all links between the two parts of the country, India hoped to force Pakistan to negotiate peace on New Delhi's terms.
The Indians, the author said, also are considering a number of other options for launching a fast but effective incursion into Pakistan without causing a full-scale war.
But in the final analysis, he said, all options to initiate war by India may look independent and workable but ultimately will lead to the same destination which both sides would like to avoid as responsible nuclear states.